Daniel Volman provides a rundown of US military spending in Africa for the coming FY 2011. President Obama is continuing and expanding:
… the militarised and unilateral security policy that had been pursued by the George W. Bush administration toward Africa, as well as toward other parts of the world.
Volman’s figures on FY 2011 Budget Requests by Country
The 38 million dollars for the Foreign Military Financing programme to pay for U.S. arms sales to African countries includes:
9 million for Liberia,
9 million for Morocco,
4.9 million for Tunisia,
2.5 million for Djibouti,
2 million for Ethiopia,
1.5 million for the Democratic Republic of Congo,
1.4 million for Nigeria,
one million for Kenya.
The 21 million dollars for the International Military Education and Training Programme to bring African military officers to the United States for military training includes:
2.3 million for Tunisia,
1.9 million for Morocco,
1 million for Kenya,
1 million for Nigeria,
1 million for Senegal,
950,000 for Algeria,
825,000 for Ghana,
725,000 for Ethiopia,
600,000 for Uganda,
500,000 for the Democratic Republic of Congo,
500,000 for Rwanda.
The 24.4 million dollars for Anti-Terrorism Assistance programmes in Africa includes:
8 million dollars for Kenya,
1 million for South Africa,
800,000 for Morocco, and
400,000 for Algeria, and
14 million for African Regional Programmes.
Creative aid, even of a military variety, focuses on the socioeconomic development of a recipient without being tied to any specific strategic objective of the donor. It is “not primarily intended to acquire anything, at least not immediately; it is extended in the hope that it will favorably affect the economic and political development of the recipient country.” On the other hand, a donor will utilize acquisitive aid to “win a comparatively specific advantage” or to “acquire” an asset. In further defining the nature of the latter, Liska postulates,
In the case of acquisitive aid the recipient’s performance substitutes directly for action by the donor. The donor either does not expect to act at all or would have to act “more” or “differently” if he could not anticipate the performance of the recipient. … The case is clearest where military and economic aid are intended to help the recipient maintain an army for local self-defense, so that the United States does not have to participate with troops or need involve only a correspondingly smaller number of troops.
This passage highlights the basic linkage between security assistance and surrogate force.
I have not seen much sign of creative aid coming from the US government to Africa for many decades. There is plenty of acquisitive aid. AFRICOM’s partnering is acquisitive aid, security assistance designed to acquire surrogate force. The gift is arms and military training so that African soldiers can fight, suffer and die for US interests, and US soldiers will not have to. But we won’t see creative aid. We won’t see aid that will favorably affect the economic and political development of the recipient country. We won’t see aid that will help develop transportation, or health, or education, or improved sanitation and sewage, or any of the things governments do to earn the consent of the governed and to govern peacefully and prosperously. We see the Africa Command in military photo op aid performing a few of these functions in local isolation. But the money for these is peanuts compared with the money for arms and military training, or even compared with the expense of just moving military equipment from place to place.