
circled above in yellow, closer up below, from Google Maps
Botswana Defence Force Base, approximately 75km from the capital Gaborone. The main runway is astonishingly long for its intended use at 3360 metres. This has led to speculation over it’s true role. Some people say it may serve as a landing and refuelling post for US spyplanes or as an alterante landing location for the space shuttle in the southern hemisphere given it’s relatively close distance to the equator.

It is obvious from the photo and caption above, taken from africom.mil, that Botswana enjoys a close working relationship with the US military.
Botswana’s one party democracy has long been a friend of the United States. Although Botswana has publicly questioned the creation of AFRICOM there have been ongoing rumors of agreements between the US and Botswana to host an AFRICOM base. That base may already be in place in the form of the Thebephatshwa Airport/Maparangwane BDF (Air Wing) Base. It is located about halfway between Molepolole and Letlhakeng, north and east of Gaborone. It is also referred to as Molepolole.
You can see it in this photo titled: A large US military base in the middle of Botswana. Taken enroute to WDH at FL350. Photo taken in 2003 by Julian Whitelaw. Click the link above to see the photo.
And Wikipedia has an interactive map of the base, info courtesy of b real, who adds:
where i found out about it was on an AFRICOM thread at the usmc’s small wars council forum & military guys there say it was indeed built by the u.s. before apartheid ended in south africa.
From discussion at Google Earth Community, bbs.keyhole.com:
The base is called Maparangwane (that might be hard for you to get your tounge around). I have been there numerous times. It was probably (these things are usually kept secret) developed with the technical support of the USAF, but in all probability was funded entirely by Botswana’s Government. We aren’t exactly a poor country. If you use the ruler and go 71.37 Kilometres West south west (thats in between west and southwest) fom this airbase you will see the country’s largest diamond mine at Jwaneng (marked by bright blue pools of some sort) – we have three. We are the 2nd largest producer of gem quality stones after Russia.
Anyways I sa with some probablity because it is possible that the ISAF have a sharing agreement with the government and might have footed some of the bill, but the country could easily afford to design and build such a thing.
. . .
The Eagle project. French influence, not US. Fighter, transport and chopper squadrons on base as well as a training squadron with PC-7 aircraft. The fighters are former canadian CF-5 A and B Freedom Fighters, which were sold to the BDF Air Arm after having been refurbished for the original 419 Squadron of the Canadian Armed Forces at CFB Cold Lake, Alberta Canada. After 419 was shut down in the mid 90s, they were sold and delivered via AN-124 air transport to the base were they were formed into 28 Squadron BDF AA. Transports are former USAF C-130 B versions, also refurbished. Choppers are 412s. Occasionally you might see a Global Express on the field. Botswana has spend considerable funds in the last 10 years on hardware from the Netherlands, Spain, France, Germany, UK, USA and Canada as well as from SA. Chinese technology and Indian expertise is present throughout the country. For such a small country they have accumulated an impressive arsenal. Although Thebe Phatswa (which is the actual base name) is the main air force base, the HQ is actually located just outside Gaborone and mostly Army. FOLs include Francistown and Maun. The foreign military in Botswana include mostly spec ops training elements from the UK US and a variety of african nations, not always with the knowledge of the BDF. Expats still run a large portion of tech intensive hardware and conduct training on various bases and in the field.
. . .AFB Molepolole (USAF and BDF) 04/26/06 11:54 AM (google earth community)
The Botswana Defence Force Air Wing is the air force of Botswana.The Air Wing was formed in 1977 and is organisationally part of the Botswana Defence Force.All squadrons are designated with a Z, which has no meaning but is used as a designation for ‘squadron’. The main base is Molepolole and was built mostly by foreign contractors from 1992 being finished around 1996.
this is the main Air base for Botswana’a Air Force. well actually that’s pretentious. The Botswana Defence Force (the Army) has an Air wing, similar to what the UK had before wwII – as there isn’t much need for a peaceful country to have a full air force.
From General Mompati S. Merafhe, the Botswana minister of foreign affairs and international cooperation, in October 2003, General Merafhe vigorously denies that it is an American airbase:
Regarding the alleged American airbase, let me state for the record that the United States does not own any military base in Botswana. The airbase that is being referred to is the Thebephatshwa Airbase that is wholly owned by the government of Botswana.
The airbase was constructed during my term as commander of the Botswana Defence Force with our own resources and without any assistance from the United States or any other country for that matter.
In fact, during construction, the Americans publicly accused Botswana of excessive military spending and threatened to cut economic aid to Botswana. So, if the Americans built the airbase, how could they then accuse us of excessive military spending on the airbase?
We have done our best to demonstrate that these allegations are false. Among other things, we have used every opportunity to conduct tours of the airbase for military dignitaries visiting Botswana, including military chiefs from the region. The purpose is to demonstrate to the region and indeed the international community that there is nothing sinister or clandestine about the airbase?
I have decided to raise this matter here because my government is seriously concerned about the damage this campaign of disinformation is doing to the image of Botswana in the region and internationally. Fortunately, we take solace in the fact that mud never sticks on a clean surface, it cakes and falls away.
From Scramble in the Netherlands comes this information about the Air Wing of the Botswana Defense Force.
The Botswana Defence Force Air Wing was formed in 1977 as a result of rising tension in the area. All squadrons are designated with a .Z., which has no meaning but is just used as a designation for .squadron.. Main base is Molepolole which was built mostly by foreign contractors from 1992 and was finished round 1996. Other bases used are the International Airport at Gaborone and Francistown.
The backbone of the Air Wing is formed by ex Canadian CF-116s which are locally designated as CF-5. Thirteen ex-Canadian CF-116s (ten single-seaters and three trainers) were ordered in 1996 to replace the Strikemasters, with another three single-seaters and two double-seaters delivered in 2000. For transport the Air Wing uses BN-2A/B, C212, CN235 and C-130Bs. Latest addition to the transport-fleet was an ex-AMARC C-130B to complement the two existing aircraft.
In 2000, three additional AS350BA helicopters were bought for Z21, bringing the total to eight.. The single Italian built AB412 has been replaced by an Bell 412EP in VIP-configuration. Z21 has a total of six Bell 412s of which the Bell412EP is being used by the VIP-Flight. Flying training is done on seven PC-7s. The VIP flight uses besides the Bell412 a Gulfstream and a Be200. In 1993 nine ex US Army/AMARC O-2As were delivered for use in the battle against poaching.
So what is actually going on between the US and Botwana. Your guess is as good as mine. But keep in mind these words from General Ward’s Q&A for his confirmation hearing, PDF: U.S. Africa Command Will Enhance Local Skills, Problem Solving, again, courtesy of b real:
on basing criteria
– – –
Some of the criteria includes: political stability; security factors; access to regional and intercontinental transportation; availability of acceptable infrastructure; quality of life; proximity to the African Union and regional organizations; proximity to USG hubs; adequate Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA). The transition team has used these criteria to narrow down potential sites. Those potential sites have been briefed to the Dept of State informally and we have begun dialogue on the advantages and disadvantages of those sites.
Botswana meets these criteria. There was also a recent article in Air Force Times about two Air Force generals named to top spots in AFRICOM, which would fit in with air bases.
Brought up from the comments, courtesy of b real, and added April 9:
THE BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE: Evolution of a professional African military
. . . No discussion of politics or military affairs in Botswana can avoid a discussion of Seretse Khama Ian Khama. He is the most eminent member of what might be called the ‘first family’ of Botswana. His father, Sir Seretse Khama, was a national hero, prominent in the struggle for full national independence, and founder of the party that has governed the country since independence, serving as the country’s president from its founding in 1966 until his death in office in 1980. When the Defence Force was created in 1977, Ian Khama was appointed its deputy commander with the rank of brigadier. Twelve years later, in 1989, he acceded to the command of the BDF with the rank of lieutenant general, a post he subsequently held for nine years. Khama’s service spanned the formative period of the Defence Force’s evolution, and despite his retirement in 1998 to enter politics, he continues to have a close connection with Botswana’s military. Khama’s current positions of vice-president and party chair of the ruling party are widely believed in Botswana to guarantee his accession to the presidency when the incumbent, Festus Mogae, steps down. However, Khama’s activities over the course of his military and political career have provoked controversy and he is accused of having very authoritarian tendencies. Many among Botswana’s educated elite view a future Khama presidency with some trepidation. . . .
From the US Dept. of State:
The United States has been the largest single contributor to the development of the BDF, and a large segment of its officer corps has received U.S. training.
. . . The United States considers Botswana an advocate of and a model for stability in Africa and has been a major partner in Botswana’s development since its independence.
Botswana, military ties the main issue, not tribe includes the mention that “One knowledgeable [military] source estimated in 2004 that 75 per cent of BDF officers above the rank of major are graduates of US military schools.”
the wikipedia entry on BDF says that “by 1999 approximately 85% of the BDF officers are said to have been trained under this system [IMET].”
It sounds very much as though Botswana is evolving away from democracy, and into a military government. And I am sure the US Department of Defense and AFRICOM are most happy and comfortable with Botswana’s movement into militarism. This provides the US with a happy and willing “partner”, well placed to act as a US surrogate on the African continent. And it puts the US Department of Defense and the Botswana government in the same business, speaking the same language. The less democracy, the more it becomes a military government, the more a few “boys in the back room” can make decisions without any pesky interference from legislatures, or the public at large. This further weakens what democracy is left. So the US can help “partner” away democratic institutions in Botswana.
This is a perfect illustration of why a military command cannot help foster democratic institutions, and economic development. The structure of a military command is a strict heirarchy organized to achieve military ends that require heirarchy and line of authority. In order to have political and economic development, a country must draw from a far wider pool for input, ideas, and investment, and defer to voices across a range of roles and ranks. It would certainly be nice if the US was investing as much money training people for other forms of public service, for all the skills that go into governing and delivering public services, water, sewars, electicity, roads, schools, clinics, hospitals, from local towns and municipalities to national governments, rather than building “defense” forces. The photo op “humanitarian” projects help, but they are no substitute for serious investment in developing civilian governing skills and institutions. Unfortunately, the current US governement does not believe in investing in these at home, and does not appear to believe in the actual practice of democracy.
What will happen if and when the citizens of Botswana become unhappy with losing their democracy to a military government? What role will the US play in that case?
April 8, 2008 at 11:00 pm
article today in nairobi’s daily nation on the militarization (& centralization) of botswana’s govt
Botswana, military ties the main issue, not tribe
[blockquote]
When new President Lt-Gen Ian Seretse Khama took over and made his first civil service and Cabinet appointments, the main bone of contention was not which tribe got what. Instead, the most controversial issue of the appointments was the continued militarisation of power in Botswana.
…
Ever since Mr Khama was lured from his post as commander of the Botswana Defence Force (BDF) in 1998, there has been what critics have said a slow but sure militarisation of power in Botswana. This became much more evident after the 2004 general elections when five of the 14 Cabinet ministers were soldiers.
The government defended the presence of the men from the barracks saying that all of them joined politics after retiring from the military. Under Mr Khama, the military presence in the Cabinet has been reduced to four after Major-General Moeng Pheto was sacked as Minister of Youth, Sports and Culture.
But this has been more than compensated for elsewhere. President Khama has made Mr Merafhe, his former boss and first commander of the BDF his vice-president. The move has been criticised on the grounds that two army generals now occupy the two most powerful positions in the land.
Another area that has realised high-profile appointment of soldier boys is the civil service. The most notable is easily the newly established Directorate of Security Intelligence (DSI) which became operational on the same day Mr Khama was sworn in. Its head is Colonel Isaac Kgosi, President Khama’s longtime aide from his military days.
Colonel Kgosi’s position has been a controversial matter in Botswana. Not too long ago, an MP asked a question in Parliament why a soldier is serving as a civil servant. Unlike the other soldiers, the colonel is not retired and is on secondment from the military – at least that is the explanation the government gave when the MP asked about Col Kgosi’s status.
As was reported by the media – but denied by the powers that be – he has been appointed the first head of the DSI, a unit that replaces the Special Branch and whose creation was controversial.
The government had to use subterfuge to get Parliament to pass the law to establish the spy-outfit.
Besides Col Kgosi, President Khama has appointed another soldier, Colonel Duke Masilo as his private secretary with the rank of deputy secretary. And, Tefo Mokaila elder brother to Cabinet minister Captain Onkokame Kitso Mokaila returns to State House as private secretary to the president – a position occupied by his father during Seretse Khama’s time.
Critics have pointed out that Serowe military homeboys are now converged at the Office of the President with Khama as head of state, Seretse as Minister of Defence and Security, Merafhe as Vice-President and Col Kgosi as head of security intelligence.
[/blockquote]
yikes
April 8, 2008 at 11:56 pm
i meant to highlight in bold that merafhe, who you quote in your post, is now the vp.
found another background piece from someone at the u.s. air war college, from 2004
THE BOTSWANA DEFENCE FORCE: Evolution of a professional African military
[blockquote]
The purpose of this article is simply to describe the evolution of Botswana ’s military establishment, note some of its current dimensions, and call attention to several of its key features. Whether Botswana’s model can (or should) be replicated elsewhere is not a primary interest of this study, but Botswana’s experience offers lessons that may well be of concern to any student of military affairs in Africa.
…
At the time of independence Botswana’s new leaders deliberately rejected the opportunity to establish a national army, opting instead for a small para military capability in a Police Mobile Unit.5 The country’s modest resources reinforced the decision: there simply was no money for a larger public sector. That choice, however, was soon severely challenged by the violent decolonisation struggles in the region, a traumatic process directly involving several of Botswana ’s neighbours including Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe ), Angola, South West Africa (now Namibia ) and ultimately South Africa. Military and insurgent forces in these conflicts were significantly larger and better armed than Botswana ’s small police force. None of the neighbours hesitated to violate Botswana ’s borders when it suited their purposes.
…
As a result, in April 1977 the country reversed its earlier decision, and by Act of Parliament, established the Botswana Defence Force (BDF), an unambiguously military establishment. The nucleus of the new military – 132 men – was drawn from the Police Mobile Unit. The Deputy Botswana Police Commissioner, Mompati S Merafhe, was commissioned a major general and appointed commander of the new force. His second-in-command, holding the rank of brigadier, was Seretse Khama Ian Khama, the 24-year-old Sandhurst-trained son of Botswana’s founding president.
…
By the mid-1980s, US and British forces were conducting small-scale annual combined exercises with the BDF in Botswana. At the same time, the country engaged in a vigorous effort to broaden its military officers, sending them en masse to military schools in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom and India. Among these were the first BDF personnel to attend command and staff and war colleges, essential education for senior military leaders in the armies of developed countries.
…
A significant milestone occurred in 1989, when the founding commander of the BDF, Lieutenant General Mompati Merafhe, retired to enter politics31 and his former deputy, Seretse Khama Ian Khama, was appointed the new commander. Khama brought a different leadership style and new priorities to this role. Like his predecessor, Khama was a strict disciplinarian, bordering on the puritanical.
…
One of Khama’s first endeavours was construction of a major new military facility –Thebephatshwa Airbase – near the town of Molepolole, some 50 km north-west of the capital – a massive project begun in 1989 and completed only in the mid-1990s. This base would ultimately house Botswana’s growing inventory of military aircraft and its commando squadron. The new military commander was secretive about his base and about BDF operations in general, which generated some unease among neighbouring countries and unanswered questions in Botswana itself.
…
The 1990s were significant years for the expansion of roles and missions of the BDF, particularly as it began to deploy for peace operations. The year 1992 marked the first external mission – when the BDF deployed for US-led peacekeeping operations in Somalia.
…
After the deployment to Somalia, Botswana began to dispatch military personnel as peace operations observers elsewhere in Africa.
…
Despite the attenuation of external threats, the 1990s were a period of substantial growth for the Botswana Defence Force. By the end of the decade, the force had surpassed a size of 10 000 personnel. It had also seen substantial increases in its firepower and mobility. Ian Khama, whose nine-year tenure as BDF commander ended in 1998, oversaw much of this expansion and seems to have been a prime mover behind the military growth.
[/blockquote]
there’s too much in that article to keep quoting everything — you’ll just have to read it — but i do want to get this in
[blockquote]
No discussion of politics or military affairs in Botswana can avoid a discussion of Seretse Khama Ian Khama. He is the most eminent member of what might be called the ‘first family’ of Botswana. His father, Sir Seretse Khama, was a national hero, prominent in the struggle for full national independence, and founder of the party that has governed the country since independence, serving as the country’s president from its founding in 1966 until his death in office in 1980. When the Defence Force was created in 1977, Ian Khama was appointed its deputy commander with the rank of brigadier. Twelve years later, in 1989, he acceded to the command of the BDF with the rank of lieutenant general, a post he subsequently held for nine years. Khama’s service spanned the formative period of the Defence Force’s evolution, and despite his retirement in 1998 to enter politics, he continues to have a close connection with Botswana’s military. Khama’s current positions of vice-president and party chair of the ruling party are widely believed in Botswana to guarantee his accession to the presidency when the incumbent, Festus Mogae, steps down. However, Khama’s activities over the course of his military and political career have provoked controversy and he is accused of having very authoritarian tendencies. Many among Botswana’s educated elite view a future Khama presidency with some trepidation.
[/blockquote]
an article on the u.s. DoS website states
[blockquote]
The United States has been the largest single contributor to the development of the BDF, and a large segment of its officer corps has received U.S. training.
…
The United States considers Botswana an advocate of and a model for stability in Africa and has been a major partner in Botswana’s development since its independence.
[/blockquote]
the first article includes the mention that “One knowledgeable [military] source estimated in 2004 that 75 per cent of BDF officers above the rank of major are graduates of US military schools.”
the wikipedia entry on BDF says that “by 1999 approximately 85% of the BDF officers are said to have been trained under this system [IMET].”
April 9, 2008 at 10:27 pm
Very much appreciate the links and info. I started to add some from what you sent to the original post, and that got me started adding more opinion. I’ll do a bit more reading and see about writing something for the African Loft on this.
Google has definitely dropped crossed crocodiles from their AFRICOM blog alerts. I think they are leaving out other sites as well, maybe African Loft and Pambazuka, possibly fpif and Africa Action, which they have included in the past, but I’m not completely certain. It will take more time to be sure It looks like military stuff or things with similar names get included but not blogs and news sites really writing about AFRICOM. And mostly they are not including much at all. Crossed crocodiles still comes up in the searches though, so if people are looking they can find info. I don’t think too many people rely on the alerts.
A friend sent a link for this book: Starved for Science: How Biotechnology Is Being Kept Out of Africa. I’m going to get a copy, but I haven’t seen it yet. This is one of the questions that worries me about the anti GM etc. crowd. I think from the point of view of farmers, we MUST have seed we can harvest and reuse. And of course zombie and terminator seeds polinating non GM crops is horrifying. If you talk to small farmers in Ghana about seed from hybrids that cannot be reliably grown out again, they think you are crazy. I’m sure there are other risks with biotechnology and GM. But all life is risky, what do we actually know. This is not meant as a rhetorical question, but as an empirical one. There are survival tradeoffs in a lot of our decisions. And one of the big questions is where is science the problem, and where is policy. I don’t have a lot of faith that people will get either right. But while we are here, we might as well try.
There is the ongoing question of why is something OK in the developed world, and not in the developing world. It is used as an excuse for irresponsible and destructive behaviour, but is still a legitimate question. And I worry about people who really want to keep Africa as some theatrical set of indigenous peoples to be used as backdrop in a variety of dramas, not permitted the opportunities that others share.
April 10, 2008 at 12:33 pm
i don’t know anything previously about paarlberg, but my bullshit detector immediately goes off when i read this interview w/ him. the article leads off w/ the case of zambia refusing gmo corn six years ago. in 2003 i attended a conference that covered this & even met dr. mwananyanda lewanika, who was involved in that decision, which was not made by a strawman anti-agscience bourgeoisie wanting to deny techological applications to african farmers.
[blockquote]
Paarlberg: The book makes the argument that the overregulation of this technology in Europe and the anxieties felt about it in the United States are not so much a reflection of risks, because there aren’t any documented risks from any GM crops on the market. I explain that reaction through the absence of direct benefit. The technology is directly beneficial to only a tiny number of citizens in rich countries—soybean farmers, corn farmers, a few seed companies, patent holders. Consumers don’t get a direct benefit at all, so it doesn’t cost them anything to drive it off the market with regulations. The problem comes when the regulatory systems created in rich countries are then exported to regions like Africa, where two thirds of the people are farmers, and where they would be the direct beneficiaries.
[/blockquote]
is not an honest or objective stmt.
i get the idea that this fella is selling a bill of goods. probably defining agriculture in terms of large-scale, monocrop industrial farms etc essentially oriented toward exports (to western markets.) and if that’s the case, then he’s actually projected the threat onto advocates of localized, organic/sustainable sytematic approaches to farming on its head, when indeed it is big-ag & the “life science” crowd that are trying to exert control over african farmers. again, i think of the african organizations that created a stmt saying, among other pertinent points, “the push for a corporate-controlled chemical system of agriculture is parasitic on Africa’s biodiversity, food sovereignty, seed and small-scale farmers.”
if you do read the book. let us know what you think of his arguments. sounds to me like he’s selling biotech for his clients & part of the campaign to get african govts to accept this new “green revolution” on the continent, esp w/ borlaug contributing an into. i would be very skeptical of the arguments they put forth & the premises upon which they sprang & keep an eye out for what external costs do they leave out.
for farmers experiences w/ biotech in developing countries, i recommend vandana shiva’s works, which focus on india. also, on gmo corn, michael pollan’s omnivore’s dilemma was a great read. i’d like to be more informed on what’s going on in african ag in this regard, but i haven’t spent enough time on it.
April 10, 2008 at 3:18 pm
re ag (i realize this is getting even farther off-topic from the botswana story, but it’s interesting none-the-less)
there’s a plenary mtg of the International Assessment of Agricultural Science and Technology for Development taking place right now in johannesburg. the IAASTD is an ongoing project, sponsored by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization, world bank & other international bodies, “is a unique international effort that will evaluate the relevance, quality and effectiveness of agricultural knowledge, science, and technology (AKST); and effectiveness of public and private sector policies as well as institutional arrangements in relation to AKST.”
earlier this year, two biggies in the biotech industry pulled out after not being able to exert their influence the project enough to their (private) interests.
east african standard: Firms pull out of Sh70m agricultural project
[blockquote]
Monsato and Syngenta have apparently pulled out of an ambitious, Sh70 million (US$10-million) agricultural project because it does not emphasise or recognise the significant contribution of modern biotechnology in agricultural development and poverty reduction.
…
[IAASTD writing and review teams (some 4,000 experts in all) comprise a grand coalition including scientists, government officials, representatives from seven UN agencies, farmers’ groups, a rainbow of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and industry, including chemicals manufacturer BASF and agri-biotech giants Monsanto and Syngenta.
However, the decision by Monsanto and Syngenta to abandon the project has been widely criticised, even by the anti-GMO crusaders.
…
No public statements have been offered, but the spokesman for CropLife told Nature that the decision was prompted by the inability of its members to get industry perspectives reflected in the draft reports. One of these perspectives is the view that biotechnology is key to reducing poverty and hunger, and it is based in part on high (and rising) levels of demand for biotech crops from farmers across the developing world.
Ms Denise Dewar of Croplife International, of which Monsanto and Syngenta are members, is quoted in the Guardian stating, “We were concerned with the direction the draft was taking and that our input was not being taken appropriately. We were looking to see references to plant science technology and the potential role it can contribute.”
…
A spokesman for the agriculture-industry body CropLife International told Nature, “This is a most reluctant decision.”
“If they can bring evidence forward that we have not been objective, or that the language is biased, then we could discuss that,” Watson said.
Insiders agree that the current draft is decidedly lukewarm about the technology’s potential in developing-world agriculture. The summary report, for example, devotes more space to biotechnology’s risks than to its benefits. The report says that evidence that biotech crops produce high yields is not conclusive. And it claims that if policy-makers give more prominence to biotechnology, this could consolidate the biotech industry’s dominance of agricultural R&D in developing countries. This would affect graduate education and training, and provide fewer opportunities for scientists to train in other agricultural sciences.
…
The idea that biotechnology cannot by itself reduce hunger and poverty is mainstream opinion among agricultural scientists and policy-makers. For example, biotechnology expansion was not among the seven main recommendations in Halving Hunger: It Can Be Done, a report commissioned by former UN secretary-general Kofi Annan.
…
Greenpeace, a member of the assessment project, said it urges the biotechnology companies to reconsider. “This assessment goes far beyond genetic engineering, it is about setting solutions for global agriculture and the world’s poor and hungry. It is such a shame to withdraw from such a good initiative, simply because your business plans do not fit with sound science and experts voiced a more balanced opinion than yours,” said Jan van Aken, a GM campaigner with Greenpeace International.
[/blockquote]
in an interview that IPS ran yesterday, “Achim Steiner — executive director of the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP),” says
[blockquote]
It was regrettable and a lost opportunity for that segment of the private sector to engage with society in this important effort. However, their claim that the IAASTD summary reports were unfair to their industry is a fallacy. This is not about biotechnology versus organic agriculture; there is no unitary way forward.
The IAASTD is creating a set of sign posts to guide future agriculture research and policy based on the evidence of where we stand today and how we got here. Multiple viewpoints from governments and others will remain a part of this week’s discussions and the final report will stand without their participation.
[/blockquote]
also, food first updated the seminal book 12 Myths About Hunger two years ago.
April 11, 2008 at 3:24 pm
several article @ this week’s pambazuka on the alliance for a green revolution in africa
AGRA, bio-piracy and food as social justice
In this wide ranging Pambazuka News interview, Mariam Mayet, the director of the African Center Biosafety speaks about biopiracy, which she calls “the last frontier”, the Alliance for a Green Revolution and its impact on Africa, and food and agriculture as social justice justice.
AGRA and African knowledge systems
Regassa Feyissa in this interview talks about the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA), the fallacy of food aid, knowledge systems in relation to traditional versus scientific and the need to create alternatives to AGRA
How healthy is AGRA for Africa?
Carol B. Thompson argues that the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa will undermine nutrition, destroy indigenous seed varieties and knowledge systems and create dependency on patented seeds. She calls for a debate so that all the stakeholders can be involved in the future of food production in Africa
A new Philanthro-Capitalist Alliance in Africa? AGRA—The Return of the Green Revolution
Bill Gates has called for “creative capitalism” – that is a philanthropy spurred on by profit. But Galés Gabirondo unmasks creative capitalism to reveal it as philanthro-capitalism. She uses the Bill Gates/Rockefeller initiative, the Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa, to show just how devastating it can be when good-will meets a corporate driven and market hungry capitalism
April 11, 2008 at 3:46 pm
I just saw your latest, I wrote a comment last night, and I think there was a blink in the electricity. When I went to publish, my comment just disappeared. I looked through the democracy document for Botswana. The information I found said pretty much the same thing in less detail than in the links you so kindly shared. Apologies for going off topic to any readers who wanted more info on Botswana.
I got into the farming mostly by accident. It is frustrating bringing presents home for people, which are never enough. By chance, one family member, who is also scrupulously honest, had always wanted a chicken farm. Resources and plans came together at the same time, so we set about creating one to generate a bit of income and a few jobs. We also started growing some cocoa and a few other crops, and some other very small businesses. It has been a big learning curve. Luckily we have had some help from some very knowledgeable people in Ghana. In a strictly micro way I’m in the farm subsidy business, and with luck there will be a bit of income when I retire there.
I am terrified of Big Ag systems that eliminate jobs as well as damaging the environment. I hate to see young people going to the cities for jobs that aren’t there. At the same time we want the benefits of any agricultural technology we can afford that that will make things cheaper and more efficient. I found one website, I’ve temporarily lost the link, that was promoting ag tech for development. I usually look at who is on the board to get a sense of an organization. They were mostly big corn and soybean growers from Iowa and nearby states. So I added a huge grain of salt to my reading.
I’ll try and follow up on the IAASTD, and much appreciate the links you share. I have a feeling I read 12 Myths About Hunger, or at least part of it some years back, and will look at it again, along with the other links.
I followed this link from a Ghanaian blogger, I think the guy has an interesting idea:
The Development Wire
I just started watching the “Wire” on DVD. It’s a very interesting show. First, every character does bad things and good things. Second, it gives a real sense of how difficult social/economic problems are to solve. It accurately conveys the sense off hopelessness people must feel when working on long standing societal problems.
I think an interesting show, similar to the Wire, could be made about economic development and foreign aid. It would document NGOs, the World Bank, bureaucrats, politicians, big foundations and academics in their efforts to distribute aid and stimulate economic growth.
The key would be to show how the self-interest of each of these groups both helps and hinders the process of growth, and to convey how complicated stimulating growth and poverty alleviation is. It would probably be most interesting if it took a monster project and presented its implementation from all sides. Something like the One Laptop Per Child program or the building of a dam.
One of the comments suggested Liberia as a possible setting. There are a number of possibilities. It would also make a good social satire too, with the same mix of behaviors and viewpoints.
April 12, 2008 at 12:53 am
veering back to botswana –
i was so completely flabbergasted after reading this commentary in kenya’s east african standard today that i have to comment on it — plus it’s by a member of the kenya human rights commission! of all the categories of people you think would be informed on such matters, human rights activists would normally rate in the top 25% or better, one would think. so it’s enough to make me scratch my head & wonder how the author of this piece could be so ignorant on the facts & implications of the very topic she writes about:
Lessons for Kenya from Botswana
[blockquote]
As we continue haggling over Cabinet portfolios and watching President Robert Mugabe’s dying kicks with bated breath, there was a quiet transition in Botswana that almost went unnoticed on April 1. It was a democratic and peaceful election in Parliament.
Festus Mogae, 69, who has been President for the past 10 years, retired on March 31, handing over to Vice-President Ian Khama, the eldest son of the late founding President Seretse Khama.
While Mogae could have chosen to extend his term, he retired honourably.
[/blockquote]
now i’ve seen many other articles that cite botswana’s smooth transition as a model for other african nations to emulate, but those were all by journalists & bloggers who take some story off the wire w/o investigating whether it’s an accurate accounting & then use that as the starting point in their effort to fill up space. but for a human rights worker to make the case she is making is ridiculous.
first off, there was NOT, so far as i have read, “a democratic and peaceful election” in botswana and mogae did not “honourably” step down rather than attempt to extend his rule for a third term — his current term didn’t end until october 2009!
there were all kinds of reports that he was retiring early for ambiguous personal reasons. here’s one — an afp article from last july:
Botswana’s Mogae set to retire
[blockquote]
Gaborone – Botswana’s President Festus Mogae has announced that he is to stand down next year after a decade at the helm of the diamond-rich southern African nation.
The 67-year-old told members of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) he would serve another nine months as head of state and then hand over to Vice President Seretse Khama Ian Khama ahead of a general election in October 2009.
“I look forward in the next nine months to retirement and rest. I do so in the conviction, that I did my best; like Frank Sinatra, I did it my way and like Tony Blair, I did what I thought was right,” he told delegates at a conference in the city of Molepolole on Saturday.
…
He came to power in 1998 in succession to Sir Ketumile Masire and was re-elected after his party triumphed over a divided opposition at the last elections in October 2004.
[/blockquote]
so what is the author of the commentary talking about? she even writes “The country goes to elections every fives years.”
october 2004 thru March 2008 doesn’t even make four.
there was no election, “democratic and peaceful” or not, was there?
obviously she’s reaching — and way over her head, do i need even point it out? — to draw an analogy to the situation in kenya.
continuing w/ her commentary,
[blockquote]
The first lesson from Botswana is that there is an honourable life after retirement, for an African President.
…
What does this mean? It is more honourable to resign than hang onto power if one wants to remain relevant after the presidency. Those who have hung on have seen their misery propel them to their graves. Hangers-on like Mugabe, Museveni and Gaddafi cannot get a nomination for recognitions or awards.
[/blockquote]
first, as is clear, mogae retired more than a year & a half before his term expired. he wasn’t even close to hanging on. and it may be very important to find out why he really did step down — at the time of the elections in neighboring zimbabwe, nonetheless — to turn over the country to the unelected lt-gen khama who immediately restructured his cabinet ahead of next year’s election. no idea how the author could see the latter as a democratic transition.
and a second point wrt her first lesson, kenya’s kibaki, as unscrupulous & disqustingly blatant as his election theft was, is not in the “hanger on” category w/ the likes of museveni & muammar — he had only served one term & still has a relatively strong base in central kenya & the economic institutions & elite. corrupt? sure. despot? not now that his friends have helped him retain his office legitimately.
missing the forest for the trees, she points out that
[blockquote]
Four women were appointed to the Cabinet of 16. Their number represents 25 per cent of Members of Parliament. The women hold the influential positions of Local Government, Health, Communications, Science and Technology and Youth, Sports and Culture. The point is that Kenyan leaders must learn from a case of an African democracy.
…
Botswana understands that gender parity in decision-making is pivotal for any balanced development to take place. That is why women constitute 25 per cent of its Cabinet.
[/blockquote]
exactly zero mention of the number of military appointees in the new regime. any teenager off the street could probably tell you that those indoctrinated in military cultures have a decisively different “decision-making” understanding than a counterpart from the civil sector. but the author hardly picks on any nuances in khama’s inaugural incantation of “discipline” as an underlying principle in his presidency.
instead, she prattles on,
[blockquote]
..a nation is better off built on fundamental human principles like democracy, development, dignity and discipline like the case in Botswana. It makes it easier for citizens to identify with these principles than the numerous abstract manifestos whose only difference is the cover page.
[/blockquote]
we’ll have to see how khama’s own definitions of “development” and “discipline” intersect w/ popular perceptions of “democracy,” but i get the notion that it won’t be in accords w/ the metrics an authentic human rights activist would normally stand up for.
and one final thing, while i’m at it — in addition to working at the kenya human rights commission, the editors tell us she “is also a member of National Youth Council.” so i find it a most interesting oversight that, while applauding botswana’s parliamentary “gender parity”, she, in addition to the ommission of the military makeup, fails to bring up the following:
Botswana: Youth Complain About Khama Cabinet
[blockquote]
President Ian Khama made no consideration for the youth last week when he appointed his new cabinet, complain youth organisations.
In his cabinet appointments, the President left out youthful MPs like Botsalo Ntuane, Edward Raletobane, Ronald Ridge and Kavis Kario who all hold degree qualifications in various fields.
Khama even appointed an old veteran, Gladys Kokorwe to the Ministry of Youth, Sports and Culture. Kokorwe, who was the deputy Speaker of Parliament prior to the appointment, served as an assistant minister before.
The fact that Khama has overlooked the youth has not gone down well with organisations that represent the youth.
The chairperson of the Botswana National Youth Council (BNYC), Elias Rantleru said they wanted a young person appointed to the cabinet.
…
The president of the Botswana Congress Party (BCP)Youth League, Sethibe Sethibe expressed disappointment that Khama did not consider young people in his cabinet reshuffle.
“We thought he was going to do something about youth empowerment. But now it is very clear that he does not want to empower the youth,” he said. Sethibe said Khama’s government is going to turn military since he seems to be only interested in working with soldiers.
The publicity secretary of the Botswana National Front (BNF) Youth League, Arafat Khan, said the fact that Khama did not appoint any young person to the cabinet, shows that he is not interested in the youth.
…
Over all, Khan dismissed Khama’s cabinet as the weakest ever in the country’s history. He said some people who do not have a background in health like Utlwang Matlhaphiri were appointed to that ministry. Matlhabaphiri is the new assistant Minister of Health, whilst Lesego Motsumi has been moved from works and transport, to head the ministry.
Khan said Khama was only picking his yes men. He said the President did not explain why he dropped the other ministers.
[/blockquote]
strange that a youth activist in kenya would not mention her allies concerns either.
whatever her motive(s), it is most misinformed & only contributes to the miseducation of the readers. someone should write a letter to the editors or something… goodness.
April 12, 2008 at 2:01 am
okay, one more off-topic ag post from me —
having a heckuva time trying to find any other references to this story right now, but here’s an example of a danger of using science to boost crop productivity:
350 suffer food poisoning
[blockquote]
More than 350 people in Lamu District are facing death due to food poisoning.
The affected, most of them members of the minority Boni community, were taken to the local health centre after eating sorghum seedlings preserved with a poisonous chemical.
Residents of Kiunga division on the Somalia/Kenya border fed on the seedlings, which had been distributed to them for planting.
…
The only health facility, Mangai Dispensary, is overwhelmed with the many cases of food poisoning.
A nurse, Mr Mohammed Abdalla, said some villagers were treating themselves with herbs instead of visiting the health facility. Yesterday, The Saturday Standard found some of the affected in their huts, writhing in pain. Abdalla said he had been forced to visit some of the villagers in their homes to give them oral dehydration salt and antibiotics.
Lamu DC, Mr Charles Mumo Mwathe, said a team of officers from his office were assessing the situation.
“The incident has come as shock to us, the Boni are an endangered community and they are now facing a new problem,” he said.
Mwathe said they were mobilising resources to help the community and said 14 victims were in serious condition.
Local councillor, Mr Yusuf Kitete, said the villagers just washed the seedlings and thought they were safe.
He said children and the elderly were the most affected.
[/blockquote]
the coverage doesn’t go into any detail about what was sprayed on the seedlings, but a quick web search shows claims that crop yields are improved by coating sorghum seeds w/ a number of herbicides, insecticides, chemicals to protect from other herbicides & so on; same for spraying the seedlings. sounds like it’s fairly common practice.
the reporting in that article may be a bit sensational — i doubt 350 “are facing death” from eating the seedlings if only 14 are in serious condition — but it’ll be interesting to find out where the seedlings came from, what exactly was on them, and what kind of safety precautions were taken along the distribution channel. imagine trying to tell someone that you can’t eat the plants b/c they’re not really edible…
and on that paarlberg interview, which i found to be full of manure, since he mentions that the resistance to biotech is predicated on fear, ignorance & scare tactics, i just want to point out this example of a genuine attempt to use a scare tactic. only it came from a known front group for the u.s. food industry & was relying on fear, ignorance & scare tactics to shamefully villify africans, activists, & concerned citizens in order to advance a commercial agenda back during that corn controversy in zambia. get a load of this crap — The New Holocaust Denial
April 12, 2008 at 2:45 pm
I’ll amble over to pambazuka tomorrow and do some reading.
And Damn! It sounds like a very quiet military coup occurred in Botswana. I hadn’t really been paying close attention. That bodes very ill indeed. And you are right about the article. The writer seems dim, and to have missed the point entirely.
April 12, 2008 at 4:01 pm
i found something provides a partial explanation why mogae stepped down between elections. this is from an iss analysis last july shortly after mogae announced his pending retirement.
Botswana: Khama Chameleon
[blockquote]
President Festus Mogae has announced that he will be retiring from office in March or April next year. He used the occasion of the ruling Botswana Democratic Party’s 32nd Congress to break the news, which came as little surprise. His predecessor, Sir Ketumile Masire, also stepped down after ten years, between elections, and Mogae, as vice-president assumed the reins of power. Now the heir presumptive is Mogae’s own vice-president, Ian Khama, retired Lieutenant-General, Paramount of the BamaNgwato, and eldest son of the late President Sir Seretse Khama.
There have been a number of observers who have drawn attention to the anomaly of Africa’s oldest democracy handling its presidential succession in a way that accords poorly with the spirit of the constitution. The new president has to do nothing to win the popular vote, even indirectly, for his party is dominant in parliament. Come the next elections in 2009, of course, there seems little that can stand in the way of another BDP victory, given the fragmented nature of an opposition riddled with internecine rivalries. The popular vote is another matter; though the BDP won 44 of the 57 elected seats it took only 52% of the ballots cast.
But though this consideration may qualify any generally favourable opinion about the depth and resilience of Botswana’s democracy, it is not here that the principal concern lies. The BDP has been in power since independence in 1966, apparently unassailable given the incompetence of its rivals. Of late, however, the presidency has shown a growing tendency to signs of intolerance of criticism, either from foreigners, or from the backbenches of the ruling party itself. Whether this is a merely a recent development or a hitherto largely dormant characteristic of Botswana’s single-party dominance is a matter for conjecture.
Public debate on the possibility of introducing a measure of proportional representation into the system, to provide for a more accurate reflection of popular opinion at election time, has been dismissed out of hand; nor has the attempt to secure public funding for political parties made any headway. It is the perceived threat of civil society interest groups to areas of the diamond industry, which is central to Botswana’s economy, that have shown most clearly President Mogae’s willingness to adopt a more menacing aspect when challenged.
…
The man who will take over the presidency in 2009 has made no secret of his dislike of the compromises of political life and of his disdain for politicians in general. Ian Khama’s authoritarian habits, honed during his time as deputy and later head of the Botswana Defence Force have irked many of his cabinet and parliamentary colleagues. His overbearing attitude was reflected in a semi-public row with the party leadership and its rank-and-file. Khama attacked the party barons as “unprincipled, intolerant, selfish vultures and monkeys”. That Khama’s more populist political style commands a measure of public support merely adds to the fury of established ministers. There is little that they can do about the succession, however, and the factional maneuverings into pro- and anti-Khama camps within the party appear to have settled, especially now that his most outspoken appointments have been given cabinet posts.
The new president will take over as chief executive officer of what looks to be a thriving enterprise. At independence in 1966 Botswana was one of Africa’s poorest countries. Today it is classified as an upper-middle-income country with a per capita income not much lower than South Africa’s. Thanks largely to abundant revenue from diamonds, it enjoyed an unequalled growth rate during the 1970s and 80s. Responsible political leadership and conservative economic policies ensured that this wealth was not squandered but used to strengthen the country’s human and physical infrastructure. There is a realisation in government that more has to be done to diversify Botswana’s narrowly based economy, and part of this strategy will involve the privatisation of some state assets, reducing the role of government in what is essentially a mixed economy.
[/blockquote]
so there is a precedent for early retirement & it’s definitely has nothing whatsoever to do w/ commonly-accepted principles of democracy, but rather to ensure uninterrupted party/tribal elite control of (1) the state apparatus and (2) diamond revenues.
here’s another (long but detailed) analysis/profile of khama, from mmegi, that emphasizes his penchant for secrecy & intelligence and establishes the foundation of his ties w/ the u.s. military:
At long last Khama will face his son(Mogae Legacy)
[blockquote]
Partnerships with United States, Canada and United Kingdom military afforded senior officers in the BDF high level training and Ian was often part of the contingents that engaged in these courses.
Ian Khama, early on showed interest in challenging areas. A source close to the military reveals that his training spans various areas of the military but his major interests seem to be Special Forces and Military Intelligence.
“He has done on and off training in very challenging areas of the military. He has had some training with almost all the major intelligence organizations. The BDF, at least at the intelligence level is much closer to the Americans and Israelis so Ian would have done a number of programs in the intelligence arms of those countries” explains the source.
…
Although a favourite among men of the forces Ian was also largely seen as someone who was obsessesed with military toys for which he could easily find funding as the first president’s son.
Within the BDF his critics, saw him, as someone who had his own people, a group of his favoured men who were beyond questioning.
“Ian has his own people, even in the army he would have these men who were central to his professional and even personal settings. He would go camping with these men. These men would be accelerated through ranks. Of course some were really good soldiers but there other good soldiers who would be overlooked just because Ian’s focus was somewhere else,” says a source.
Ian Khama built a team of men from MI, Commando and others from other divisions, who would be the structure on which he would control the army.
In the 90s when the region became independent the BDF’s agenda included various international missions. The building of Thebephatshwa Airbase was credited to Ian.
…
However Ian’s era at the BDF was cut short by another imperative: this time of a much more family-related matter. The Botswana Democratic Party, founded by Seretse, was faced with a growing disillusionment both within its ranks and nationally.
When political consultant Lawrence Schlemmer concluded that the then embattled BDP needed someone to salvage it from that morass of late 80s and 90s unpopularity, he may not have specifically called for Ian Khama as he pointed out recently but those in the know must have immediately known who he was referring to.
Khama was also favoured by the corporate interests at the heart of the BDP’s survival; they saw him as someone who was not tainted by personal financial considerations.
An ailing party led by an equally ailing generation seen completely out of step with the political mood of that time, the party needed Ian Khama.
…
In a country where ethnicity and feudal considerations still matter, Ian Khama had the right blood and the right connections.
It is also possible, given the context within which the party approached him, that the BDP needed Khama much more than he needed it. If that is true, then it partly explains how the party came to be so accommodating of his foibles.
Khama has at times gotten away with much more than any member of the party could get away with.
Ian Khama has castigated MPs including his own party’s, calling them ‘vultures’ for asking for salary increases when he himself makes a lot more and costs government even more, critics pointed out. This made him very unpopular amongst MPs but he endeared himself to the public for these stunts showed him as a man of principle who is prepared to go against the grain.
In other words, the Khama the BDP needed is not necessarily the Khama that it came to have. The BDP thought in Ian Khama it had a modern Seretse Khama. A man who could connect with the average Motswana the way Seretse Khama did. But Ian Khama is no Seretse Khama. In his own way Ian Khama has gone about organizing the BDP into a party he can lead.
The ‘Khama Agenda’ consists of three major parts: to decimate his enemies within the party and consolidate his power, to replicate the same on a national level and ultimately leave a legacy worthy of the expectation that surrounded his ascendance to the national stage.
Khama may have had a big foe within BDP when he took over but now what remains of that big foe is but a big party to run. He has decimated and co-opted most of his opponents and he is now going about dividing up the party into small groups which can be managed much more effectively.
…
Military men love loyalists and Khama has surrounded himself with loyalists even within the BDP.
…
In 2006 the Security and Intelligence Bill was brought before parliament. After several denials, the government finally confirmed that it intended to establish a Directorate of Intelligence and Security. Bill number 23 of 2006 published in the Government Gazette of November 3 stated that a Central Intelligence Committee, a National Intelligence Community and a Security Council would have oversight over the directorate.
The bill says it had become necessary to establish the new structures because the regional and global environment had changed necessitating a review of Botswana’s approach to security concerns.
However critics of the Bill noted that it gave too much power to the president and everyone else appointed by the president, the Minister, the Commanders of BDF and Commissioner of Police, and yet possessed no oversight provision.
Commentators, even some BDP MPs, spoke of how this Bill was Ian’s baby, and how he wanted to keep it as security-focused as possible.
…
Government Enclave was abuzz with allegations that this whole thing was Ian Khama’s design, and that he thought the scrutiny and criticisms were a sort of delay to the implementation of his favourite apparatus.
It was seen as part of Ian Khama’s continuing preparations to take over as president: a much more authoritarian, paranoia-riddled and anti-democratic era.
…
“Khama is a man who likes to follow everything to its last detail, and that’s why he likes Intelligence. He keeps records of everything that he thinks is important. He has a theory that says, ‘intelligence everywhere’, in other words, if the BCP has a central committee meeting somewhere in Shakawe, if we do not have an officer there we better have an informant there” says an inside source.
…
It is this obsession with covert operations against institutions that opposition parties criticize Ian Khama for.
“Honestly speaking Ian thinks that everything in the country has to be carefully watched. Sometimes it is a genuine concern because security in the country has not been up to scratch. He believes that a lot of the criminal activities happening in the country would not happen if intelligence was up to date. He has a genuine concern for the security and national integrity of this country. He believes national security could be handled much better” says the source.
Inside the BDP Ian Khama is said to be consolidating his power to further run it the way he would really want: sharp, non-democratic and singularly attentive to his orders, say critics.
…
Khama is taking over a functioning economy, and he is not expected to do anything different to the overall economic policy. He is very popular among the rural folk especially. He is known to have his eye on fighting crime and corruption. Some cite the current high profile cases before the courts as the tip of the iceberg.
“He is upright generally. He hates dishonesty, and he punishes severely,” adds another source close to the Office of the President.
So instead of a different dish, Khama is expected to offer a different spice to the same dish but even then it is enough to cause consternation within the political and even civil service environment. Bureaucrats fear his almost personal way of running things, fearing he might overrun institutional ways of addressing issues.
[/blockquote]
i have yet to find any analysis which portends an optimistic outlook for khama’s reign.
April 12, 2008 at 10:56 pm
Too yikes! I looked a little bit at Botswana’s “automatic succession” and saw the precedent, and that not everyone is happy with it but they weren’t able to legislate it away. Khama’s “intelligence” obsessions sound a bit like Cheney’s in the article, which is hardly reassuring. In the course of an image search I found on Mmegi, A Botswana without a ‘First Lady’? that Khama is single. That is extremely weird and unusual in Africa, especially for a leader.
More reading and writing tomorrow . . .
April 12, 2008 at 11:48 pm
yea, other articles have alleged a particular reason why that is, but i haven’t brought it up b/c AFAIK it has never been substantiated, though it could explain the preoccupation w/ secrecy, loyalty & such.
April 13, 2008 at 5:47 pm
After seeing all the revelations about the repressive authoritarians connected with the Bush administration, and their secrecy/loyalty behaviors, the Botswana situation looks even less healthy. I wish I knew how to write comedy. Stuff like this is really asking for the right writer:
Within the BDF his critics, saw him, as someone who had his own people, a group of his favoured men who were beyond questioning.
“Ian has his own people, even in the army he would have these men who were central to his professional and even personal settings. He would go camping with these men. These men would be accelerated through ranks.
July 31, 2008 at 11:46 pm
in one of the comments above i wrote
it may be very important to find out why he really did step down — at the time of the elections in neighboring zimbabwe, nonetheless — to turn over the country to the unelected lt-gen khama
nairobi’s daily nation (july 31, 2008) provides some details
Diplomacy: Botswana ceases praising in public and scolding in private
[blockquote]
Dismissed as an upstart in African diplomacy and regional power politics for long, Botswana has suddenly emerged as the most vocal and concerted voice in the continent against the Zimbabwe crisis.
The diamond-rich southern African country now rivals South Africa and Zambia as the focal points of southern African diplomacy. Through straight talk and bold pre-emptive actions, Botswana has won the diplomatic initiative on Zimbabwe and emerged as an important player in the region, thanks to the new administration of President Ian Khama who took over in April.
As the rest of Africa wrings its hands at every turn on how to handle the unfolding crisis in Zimbabwe, previously less regarded Botswana has provided leadership by being very clear and proactive on the matter.
Days after coming to power, Khama engineered an emergency summit of Southern African Development Community (SADC) in Lusaka, Zambia to discuss Zimbabwe post-election crisis. Despite opposition from some countries, Botswana made sure that Zimbabwean opposition leader, Morgan Tsvangirai of the Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) attended the summit although he is not a head of state.
…
Meanwhile, the straight-shooting new Botswana Foreign Minister, Phandu Skelemani, kept the pressure by releasing unequivocal statements on the crisis occasioned by an electoral result that had not produced an outright winner and President Mugabe’s reluctance to organise a free and fair run off.
At the same time, the state media in Botswana was instructed to highlight the situation in Zimbabwe through special reports. For the first, the Botswana authorities allowed journalists from privately media unfettered access to the refugees.
At the AU Summit in Egypt weeks later, Botswana through its Vice-President Mompati Merafhe did not mince words. In the presence of the combative Mugabe, Merafhe was very categorical that the controversial one-man Zimbabwean presidential election run-off that gave Mugabe victory was a nullity and called for the exclusion of Zimbabwe from AU or SADC meetings to avoid legitimising the run off.
Contrary to tradition, Botswana publicised the hard-hitting presentation it made at the AU Summit. Back in Gaborone, Skelemani followed the representation in Egypt stressing that Botswana did not recognise Mugabe and his government. Skelemani’s logic was simple: Zimbabwe under Mugabe had committed itself to SADC principles on elections and had to honour them.
As SADC observers and other election monitors had dismissed the Zimbabwean presidential election run-off as utterly flawed, it was a given that whoever claimed was in office because of that poll was relying on an illegality.
While this argument is right, perhaps the point of departure is the manner in which Botswana has handled the Zimbabwe crisis.
Gaborone’s approach has been robust with very little of the usual diplomatic waffling and double-speak so common in African politics.
…
The change in Botswana’s diplomacy from a see-no-evil, hear-no-evil and speak-no-evil has been as sudden as it has been effective.
Within hours of coming to power on April 1, Khama performed a major reshuffled the Botswana cabinet and civil service, dropping five cabinet ministers and promoting long-serving Foreign Affairs Minister, Merafhe, to vice-presidency.
His place at Foreign Affairs was taken by Skelemani who moved from Defence, Justice and Security. Under the veteran politician Merafhe, Botswana’s foreign policy and diplomacy had been laid back and silent in what became known as “we scold in private, but praise in public”.
Though a former police chief and army commander, Merafhe was a master at cautious speak and circular diplomatic talk, never revealing much and talking out of turn. In former President Festus Mogae, he found a boss who was not willing to rock the regional diplomatic set-up.
When told to be more robust on the Zimbabwe issue, Mogae pleaded that Botswana was a small country and didn’t have the clout to impose its will on anybody least of all Mugabe. He added that Botswana could only advise behind closed doors which could either be taken up or ignored.
Ironically, Merafhe should have been more fitted to the current strengthening of Botswana diplomacy and foreign policy but not Skelemani. With his military background Merafhe should have been blunter than Skelemani, a former Attorney-General.
It is likely that the performance of the two ministers has been so different because of the men they served. While Khama is not afraid to rattle the old boys club of southern African presidents, his predecessor Mogae showed no such guts.
…
Previously, there has been pressure on Botswana that as Africa’s longest running multiparty democracy and economic success story to take the lead in effecting good governance in the continent.
Proponents of this argument said that Botswana was the only country in Africa with the moral authority to lecture others on democracy, good governance and peace and didn’t have to be apologetic about it.
However, under both Sir Ketumile Masire and his successor, Mogae, Botswana seemed to put much emphasis on domestic matters than foreign affairs. While Masire had a foreign affairs nightmare in the form of apartheid South Africa, Mogae had no such ill-luck. However, the two men shared the advantage of leading a country hosting the headquarters of SADC, arguably the most vibrant regional organisation in Africa. This however, added little to Botswana’s diplomatic weight until Khama arrived on the scene.
[/blockquote]