In Private military industry continues to grow, Rafael Enrique Valero describes the growth industry of people who fight and spy for private gain, mercenaries.
The mercenary corporations have a trade association and lobbying arm, with the Orwellian name of International Peace Operations Association. They held their annual convention in October 2007, attended by among others, Army Lt. Col. James Boozell.
. . . Army Lt. Col. James Boozell, a branch chief of the Stability Operations/Irregular Warfare Division at the Pentagon, said that the U.S. military was in fact experiencing a “watershed” moment in its 200-plus-year history — nation building was now a core military mission to be led by the Army.
. . . his presence at the association’s trade meeting sent a clear message — boom times for nation building are here to stay . . .
The Army understands this. Globalization has weakened borders and ratcheted up commerce even as it breaks down a country’s physical and psychological security. Transnational actors such as Al Qaeda are seeking bases in failed and feeble states worldwide. Africa is particularly vulnerable.
Of course there are a variety of transnational actors, including the oil companies. In Africa these actors are trying to co-opt African resources. That is why Africa is particularly vulnerable.
“Peace operations” and “nation building” are what the military and the mercenaries call their activities. But just like Bush’s “healthy forests” and “clear skies” initiatives, the names mean the opposite of what they do.
While African states are trying to put the culture of military rule behind them, the United States appears determined to demonstrate that most civilian activities in Africa should be undertaken by armed forces. – Samuel Makinda
Right now, the debate is about private security contractors — in particular, Blackwater’s shooting of civilians in Iraq — and how to control these corporate warriors in a theater of conflict. Maybe that’s the least of our worries.
. . . as stability operations become the norm worldwide, it is certainly possible that civilian and military interests could blur into a self-perpetuating, symbiotic relationship. Experts wonder if it could lead the United States into a period of “liberal imperialism” that oddly mirrors the British, French, and Dutch East India companies of the 1600s and 1700s — private entities sanctioned by governments to do their bidding.
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MPRI advertises that it works only on international projects endorsed by the U.S. government, and that claim is true as far as it goes. But the company’s well-connected executives, most of them former military brass, know how to lobby Congress to get the contracts they want. Indeed, DynCorp, MPRI, and other private security contractors are heavily staffed and run by former officers who maintain close ties to the men they once led.. . . after MPRI requested a license to evaluate Equatorial Guinea’s defense department in 1998, the State Department denied the permit because of the West African country’s poor human-rights record. MPRI ex-generals then lobbied Congress and the State Department, arguing that engaging the country “rather than punishing it” would, Avant writes, “foster better behavior in the future and enhance U.S. oil interests.” The application was then approved but was quickly flagged by the State Department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor. MPRI executives again pressed their case to the right people; in 2000, although Equatorial Guinea’s human-rights record had not changed, State approved the contract.
“I think that the thing you’re pointing out with MPRI’s contract is the degree to which a company with a commercial interest can have influence on policy,” Avant said in an interview. “Now, of course, that happens all the time. But I think it nonetheless opens the question of whether U.S. foreign policy is in the pursuit of ‘U.S. interests’ by some objective definition, or whether it’s in pursuit of interests of a smaller number of people.
. . .
President Bush, . . . has directed the Pentagon to create the U.S. Africa Command by late 2008 to “help coordinate the work of other U.S. government agencies, particularly the State Department and the U.S. Agency for International Development” to assist African governments and their young rapid-reaction African Standby Force, meant “to provide security and respond in times of need” to troubled nations.— private relief and development groups and other organizations might not want to work with the U.S. military. Relief groups are steadfast about their neutrality when they are working in war zones in unstable countries; they don’t want one side accusing them of helping the other. In an essay, Carolyn Bryan of USAID writes that contractors and NGOs may not want to compromise their neutrality, because “it increases their risk of being targeted by insurgents.” This separation between the military and the NGOs is called “humanitarian space,” Bryan says, “and is not always understood by the military, who would prefer to join forces with the NGOs and their activities.”
. . .
The private contractors “contradict the military culture’s foundation of sacrifice for the collective good,”
. . .
. . . in the blurry asymmetrical wars of the future, how long will it be before a president decides to “go off the books” and hire a small private army to fight a war. It wouldn’t be hard to do.“The big risk is not what the companies are going to do in and of themselves,” Avant said. “The big risks are what the consumers are going to ask them to do.”
Of course presidents have already gone “off the books” to fight their wars. That is what Reagan’s Iran Contra was about. A lot of Bush’s Iraq war is off the books, look for the missing billions. It looks like this pattern could become a lot worse.
That is one reason why:
AFRICOM is not about large forces, or large military bases. “It’s not about troops. Its really about headquarter staff, military and civilians; people who oversee programs, they do planning and coordinate security assistance programs.”
AFRICOM can be the pass through vehicle for covert actions and “off the books” operations, “security assistance programs”. That is the reason Bush/Cheney want a huge and thriving mercenary industry. And when they are gone, the industry will still be thriving.
2/2008 – You can read my article on mercenaries in Africa over at the African Loft: The Rising Mercenary Industry and AFRICOM.
January 25, 2008 at 1:48 am
two other reasons that DoD or whoever can state that AFRICOM is “not about troops” are that (1) it’s a unified combatant command that will draw manpower – special forces on land, navy by sea, air force for transport – when it needs it from where it can w/o housing its own reserves, and (2) one of the objectives would be to get african forces to do the bulk of the dirty work so that mass u.s. troops aren’t necessary in-theater. the mercs and private armies would contract for security (bodyguards & protection), training, logistics, etc. maybe more – after all, still plenty of mercs already in africa, just waiting around for opportunities.
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saw your question the other thread the other day — i’ve printed out those articles & will read them this w/e
January 25, 2008 at 11:59 pm
quotable quote from a voa story friday
“There is, I think, great synergy between what CJTF-Horn of Africa does now and what we’re about and what AFRICOM will represent as a combatant command,” said the commander.
The admiral expresses the mission as “the three Ds,” development, defense and diplomacy,” said Admiral Greene.
January 26, 2008 at 12:48 am
I thought they had dropped the 3 Ds, not exactly fast learners.
Did you see the full text of the NCBL document was posted at allAfrica.com?
Africom Threatens the Sovereignty, Independence and Stability of the Continent
and at Pambazuka.
I think their recommendation to not enlist, or not serve in Africa or Iraq, is not a particularly effective push back. It may drop recruitment a bit, but it won’t link cause and effect where it counts. Whats needed is a bit of grass roots organizing, community groups, churches, etc, conveying the message to congressional representatives, who aren’t exactly eager to learn. It isn’t easy or speedy. But all of this will play out in slow motion anyway, except for the people on the ground taking the hits.
February 3, 2008 at 12:56 am
XCroc –
finally got the time to read the longer article by valero. thank you for pointing it out b/c i hadn’t come across it otherwise. it’s good. don’t agree w/ a couple of his unquestioned assumptions, but overall it was useful. you pointed out one of the flaws – that the u.s. goes “off the books” this way already – and i’d include the author’s contention that “transnational actors such as AQ are seeking bases in failed and feeble states worldwide” and that “africa is particularly vulnerable”.
and there’s an entire connection that he fails to really flesh out — that of private military companies and energy security operations, specifically oil. there’s an entire book waiting to be written on that subject, i’d wager.
valero zeros in on the “stability operations” mandate of the u.s. military “to help establish order that advances U.S. interests and values” – in either existing “failed states” or after destabilizing operations to level the playing field. either way, that “core” mission — “stability operations” — is just another euphemism for “imperialism” and i don’t think many will have a problem seeing through the rhetoric.
and that nation-building is not popular w/ practically anyone — the u.s. public, u.s. representatives, or, most importantly, the subjects of said “nation-building” experiments — it should make it easier to amass oppositional momentum toward the ends of neutralizing such missions. ever since the first rumblings of proposals for AFRICOM began gurgling up from the belly of the beast, one could sense the issue of sovereignty in africa manifesting into a new anti-imperialism mvmt. latin america has largely escaped from the tightened clutch of the eagle’s talons – it should not be allowed to alight & build a nest on the motherland. ;-)
had a few issues w/ that other article you pointed out from the at point blank range blog.
for one, this hardly makes sense – “The militarization of U.S. Africa policy is highlighted by the fact that USAID .. and State Department officials are to be assigned to the AFRICOM headquarters.” huh? militarization is most emphasized by the presence of USAID and DoS?
and the militarism of u.s. policy in africa centers of programs to professionalize indigenous militaries, not “on propping up dictators”, though that is certainly a feature of it.
and i’m not sure what they mean by “the transfer of assets from middle eastern operations to AFRICOM will be at minimal cost and logistics” for contractors.
the list of programs, which i only skimmed, looked okay, but the article’s ideologically-motivated tone (ha – i should talk, after that paragraph earlier!) drowns out the research-oriented offerings of the piece, IMO.
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did read the NCBL doc & passed it around. you’re prob correct that it won’t stop kids from enlisting or participating, but at least they’ve come out w/ a firm position on AFRICOM – which is more than i’ve seen from the likes of the congressional black caucus and others who could reach key audiences. maybe it’ll have some impact in leading others to do more.
still trying to catch up on readings from the past week – haven’t had the chance to digest your latest post at the loft nor to read the rawlings transcript yet. the PMC angle WRT africa and AFRICOM is a solid one, though, and crucial to keep up on. looks like you’re right on top of it.
February 6, 2008 at 1:27 am
I think Somalia is an example of stability operations. And Valero didn’t even hint at the entire connection that he fails to really flesh out — that of private military companies and energy security operations, specifically oil. I tend to think this is more dangerous and more hidden than the state sponsored stuff, insofar as it is different, and especially since corporations have more money than a lot of states. I’m sure there is a book in it, but not an easy one to research. I wonder if the ISS study will get into this. I have no idea if they have hidden agendas, and how many and what kind. But it seems likely there are some.
I decided the at point blank range guy was too much of a whack job to link. I think I’ll use his list of programs. I looked at it briefly in comparison to the list Daniel Vollman made, and they are pretty much the same, though I need to go back and look at them more carefully. I too wondered about the meaning of some of the points you mention. My knowledge has so many gaps it is sometimes hard to tell if something doesn’t make sense, or does make sense, and I just don’t know enough to tell.
I liked the Valero article too, though I had similar quibbles to yours. Qaeda hardly seems the major danger in Africa. Nobody likes outsiders coming in, claiming they are more holy, and bossing people around.
I started reading Corporate Warriors. I’ve just begun it, so can’t say much yet. PMCs look like a recurring theme, so I’d like to know a bit more. This seems like an attempt to take a balanced look.